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I. INTRODUCTION
In Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes,2 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the corporate veil may not be pierced absent a showing of improper
conduct. The Dania court quoted lengthy passages from prior Supreme
Court of Florida cases dealing with this issue, including Riley v. Fatt,
4
Advertects v. Sawyer,5 and Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer6 to support its
holding. However, the court made no attempt to reduce the passages into a
workable formula that could be used to determine what types of conduct
might be considered improper, and furthermore, did not indicate from where
the improper conduct standard was derived. 7
As a result, Florida courts and practitioners faced with the piercing
issue do not have a clear set of guidelines or elements that can be used to
evaluate whether the shareholder conduct in question will warrant piercing
the corporate veil. Consequently, the purpose of this article is to examine
Dania and the cases cited therein, as well as post-Dania decisions, in an
effort to define a set of factors or guidelines that can be used with some
consistency to determine what type of conduct might be considered im-
proper.
In addition, the article will examine Oregon law, which also requires a
finding of improper conduct to pierce the corporate veil, to show the rela-
tionship between equitable estoppel and piercing the corporate veil, and how
the elements of equitable estoppel might be used to prove improper conduct.
Before beginning to evaluate the Dania decision or Oregon law, however, a
brief overview of the history and theories behind piercing the corporate veil
is necessary.
2. 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984).
3. Id. at 1121.
4. 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950).
5. 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
6. 153 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1963).
7. It is of some interest that the phrase "improper conduct" was mentioned in two other
piercing the corporate veil cases in Florida long before the Dania decision; however, those
cases do not seem to lend any support in deciphering what type of conduct can be considered
improper. See Advertects, 84 So. 2d at 24; Coryell v. Pilkington, 39 F. Supp. 142, 145 (S.D.
Fla. 1941), afrd, 317 U.S. 406 (1943). Of further interest, is the fact that the seventeenth
century chancery courts used improper conduct as a standard in denying requests for specific
performance. The chancery courts defined improper conduct as, among other things,
negligent misrepresentation. See also Kevin M. Teeven, Decline of Freedom of Contract
Since the Emergence of the Modem Business Corporation, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 145
(1992).
[Vol. 21:663
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II. THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
"Piercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in corporate law
and yet it remains among the least understood."8  Notwithstanding the
inherent confusion, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is easily
understood by acknowledging that incorporation's single valuable attribute
is limited liability. "Limited shareholder liability was extended to corporate
shareholders to encourage risk capital investments." 9  In describing the
necessity of limited liability, William 0. Douglas once said that "[i]t is
legitimate for a man or group of men to stake only a part of their fortune on
an enterprise."' 0 Behind these theories, the attribute of limited liability did
in fact encourage investment and have a positive effect on the economy; but
as incorporation became more popular, limited shareholder liability led to
abuses of the corporate forum.'1 As a result, courts began to disallow
shareholders limited liability protection when they used the corporation as a
vehicle to achieve some type of inequity, and in a manner not contemplated
by law. This process became known as piercing the corporate veil.
Probably the most important point to be made about the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is that it is not itself a cause of action.12 In most
cases, a plaintiff cannot seek to pierce the corporate veil until the corporation
itself is found liable13 and the judgment against it is returned unsatisfied.14
This process is most easily explained in that the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil originated in courts of equity.15 Historically, a prerequisite to
seeking relief in a court of equity was that there be no adequate remedy at
law.
16
8. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991) (footnote omitted).
9. Amfac Foods, Inc. v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1097 (Or.
1982).
10. Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39
YALE L.J. 193, 193-94 (1929).
11. Amfac, 654 P.2d at 1097.
12. See Turner Murphy Co. v. Specialty Constructors, Inc., 659 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); WELIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (1990).
13. FLETCHER, supra note 12, § 41.
14. Elizabeth Diane Clark, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Florida: The Requirement of
"Improper" Conduct, 16 STETSON L. REv. 59,61 (1986).
15. See FLETCHER, supra note 12, § 41.
16. HENRY L. MCCLINTOK, PRINCIPALS OF EQUITY 47 (1948).
1997]
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For example, if a plaintiff is successful in a suit against a corporation
but the judgment rendered against the corporation is returned unsatisfied,
due to the fact that the corporation is insolvent, the plaintiff despite receiving
the judgment, would not have an adequate remedy at law because the
corporation's insolvency would not permit the legal remedy to be carried
through. In this situation, a plaintiff could then seek equitable relief because
the remedy at law is inadequate. Equity principals, under the proper circum-
stances, would then be used to pierce the corporate veil and hold the share-
holders, who would otherwise have limited liability to the amount of their
investment in the corporation, personally liable for the judgment against the
corporation. In sum, piercing the corporate veil is simply a means of
enforcing a judgment against a corporation.
The confusion surrounding application of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil, and possibly other doctrines or causes of action that origi-
nated in equity, may well have to do with the merger of law and equity. It
has been said that "[w]hen the principles of equity force their way into the
common law they lose their cohesiveness and fly apart."'17  As further
analysis indicates, the standards and metaphors that have resulted from the
application of the once purely equitable remedy of piercing the corporate
veil in courts of law are no exception.
Ill. METAPHORS USED FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
There have been a number of formulations suggested by courts as to the
proper standard for piercing the corporate veil.' 8 The most typical standards
17. RALPH A. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 258 (1961).
18. See generally PHILLIP BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS § 6.01 (1987), a
multi-volume treatise on piercing the corporate veil. Professor Blumberg asserts that there are
three main variants in piercing jurisprudence-instrumentality, alter ego, and identity. The
"instrumentality" doctrine has three factors-"excessive exercise of control; wrongful or
inequitable conduct; and [a] causal relationship to the plaintiffs loss." Id. § 6.02. The "alter
ego" doctrine holds that piercing is proper when:
(1) such unity of ownership and interest exits that the two affiliated corporations
have ceased to be separate and the subsidiary has been relegated to the status of
the 'alter ego' of the parent; and (2) where recognition of them as separate enti-
ties would sanction fraud or lead to an inequitable result.
Id. § 6.03.
[The "identity" doctrine] is such a diffuse and relatively useless approach that it
does not deserve extended discussion.... [The standard is] "that there was such
a unity of interest and ownership that the independence of the corporations had
in effect ceased or had never begun, an adherence to the fiction of separate iden-
4
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used in piercing the corporate veil cases seem to be the mere instrumentality
doctrine and the alter ego doctrine. 19 The mere instrumentality approach is
most often associated with parent-subsidiary cases.20 Florida courts have
characterized the mere instrumentality doctrine as "'total domination of the
subservient corporation, to the extent that the subservient corporation
manifests no separate corporate interests of its own and functions solely to
achieve the purposes of the dominant corporation."'
21
The alter ego approach is more appropriate when the corporation is
made up of one or two shareholders.22 The alter ego theory is usually
invoked by demonstrating that the shareholders have failed to separate their
personal affairs from that of the corporation.23 Notwithstanding these more
common approaches, there are numerous other rules and formulations that
courts have relied on to pierce the corporate veil.24 Most courts and com-
mentators agree, however, that the labels used to describe piercing the
corporate veil are useless metaphors.
Another area of conflict in piercing the corporate veil law revolves
around the concept of fraud. On one extreme is the view that "fraud" must
be pleaded and proven.2 5 On the other extreme is the view that proof of
plain fraud is not a necessary prerequisite to pierce the corporate veil.26
tity would serve only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the economic en-
tity to escape liability arising out of an operation of one corporation for the
benefit of the whole enterprise."
Id. § 6.04 (quoting Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552,558 (Conn. 1967)).
19. J. Penn Carolan, III, Disregarding the Corporate Fiction in Florida, 27 U. FLA. L.
REv. 175, 175-76 (1974); see generally BLUMBERG, supra note 18.
20. See Vantage View, Inc. v. Bali E. Dev. Corp., 421 So. 2d 728, 735 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
21. Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 425 So. 2d 594, 598 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1982), affirmed in part and quashed in part, 450 So. 2d 1114 (1984) (quoting Krivo Indus.
Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973),
modified per curiam, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974)).
22. See Biscayne Realty & Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co., 148 So. 560, 565-66 (Fla.
1933); see also Clark, supra note 14, at 67; BLUMBERG, supra note 18, § 6.03 (discussing
generally the elements of each test).
23. MICHAEL W. GORDON, 2 FLA. CORP. MANUAL § 13.25 (1996).
24. Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the In-
quiry, 55 DENv. L.J. 1, 1-7 (1978).
25. See, e.g., Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., 127 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1955). The Bartle
court stated "[g]enerally speaking, the doctrine of 'piercing the corporate veil' is invoked 'to
prevent fraud or to achieve equity'.... But in the instant case there has been neither fraud,
misrepresentation, nor illegality." Id. at 833 (citation omitted).
26. See Vantage View, 421 So. 2d at 734 (citing Levenstein v. Sapiro, 279 So. 2d 858
(Fla. 1973) (footnote omitted). See also Krendl & Krendl, supra note 24, at 21.
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Under this second view, the fact that a corporation is a "mere instrumental-
ity" of another corporation is, in most cases, sufficient to pierce the veil.
The Dania decisions exemplify the lack of uniformity and general
confusion associated with piercing the corporate veil standards mentioned
above. The district court in Dania applied the "mere instrumentality" test
and held "it was not necessary to establish fraud or other wrongdoing on the
part of Saturday [the parent] under the mere instrumentality doctrine." 27 The
Supreme Court of Florida, as discussed infra, quashed this formulation,
holding instead that the district court decision directly and expressly con-
flicted with decisions of the supreme court which held that the corporate veil
could not be pierced absent a showing of improper conduct.28 In other
words, satisfying the "mere instrumentality" test alone was insufficient to
pierce the corporate veil. 29
What is equally significant is that the court did not say that "fraud"
must be proven, only that "improper conduct" must be proven.30 While it is
clear that proof of fraud would satisfy the improper conduct test, it is far
from clear what other conduct might also satisfy that test. It is submitted
that the Supreme Court of Florida's formulation was designed to chart a
middle course between those tests requiring proof of fraud and those that
allow piercing without proof of either fraud or wrongdoing. Although the
supreme court gave no precise formula, no exact parameters, and no list of
elements to the test, a review of the Dania opinion, and the cases cited
therein, assists in creating a standard that can be used to indicate what type
of conduct may be considered improper.
IV. THE DANA DECISION
In Dania, a woman was hit by a car in the parking lot of a jai-alai
fronton owned by Dania Jai-Alai, Inc.31 The car that hit the woman was
driven by a valet who was employed by Carrousel, Inc. 32 Carrousel was the
sister corporation of Dania Jai-Alai that handled valet parking and other
27. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1116.
28. Id. at 1121.
29. See In re Homelands of DeLeon Springs, Inc., 190 B.R. 666, 670 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1995) (stating that the mere instrumentality doctrine cannot be used without a showing of
improper conduct).
30. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1121.
31. Id. at 1115-16.
32. Id. at 1116.
[Vol. 21:663
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aspects of the jai-alai business.33 Both Dania and Carrousel were wholly-
owned subsidiaries of Saturday Corporation.34
The woman chose to sue all three corporations as a result of the injuries
she sustained from being hit by the car. Specifically, she sued Carrousel for
the negligence of its parking attendant and independent negligence, Dania
for alleging that Carrousel was its mere instrumentality or alter ego, and
Saturday for alleging Carrousel and Dania were its mere instrumentalities. 3
The trial court found that Dania and Carrousel were Saturday's mere
instrumentalities "and that it was not necessary to establish fraud or other
wrongdoing on the part of Saturday under the mere instrumentality doc-
trine. 36 The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed that it is not necessary
to show improper conduct in order to pierce the corporate veil.37 Therefore,
the issue posed for the Supreme Court of Florida was whether it was neces-
sary to show fraud or wrongdoing in order to pierce its corporate veil.
The supreme court reversed the Fourth District's holding.38 The court
held that absent some showing of "improper conduct" the corporate veil
could not be pierced.39 The court relied on Riley v. Fatt,40 Advertects, Inc. v.
Sawyer Industries,4' and Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer,42 previously
decided Supreme Court of Florida cases on piercing the corporate veil and
general corporate law, as authority for its holding.43 Accordingly, a review
of these cases will help reveal what types of conduct can be considered
improper.
Riley v. Fatt44 was the first case the Dania court relied on for its holding
that "improper conduct" must be shown in an action to pierce the corporate
veil.45 In that case, Fatt contracted with Riley Builders to make improve-
ments to his property. When Riley Builders breached the contract, Fatt
33. l at 1115.
34. L
35. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1116.
36. Id
37. l
38. Id. at 1121.
39. Id
40. 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950).
41. 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
42. 153 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1963).
43. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1119-21.
44. 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950).
45. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1119-20.
1997]
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obtained a judgment against the corporation to be satisfied out of the assets
of the corporation in the amount of the value of the breach.
46
When the judgment was returned unsatisfied, Fatt sought to hold the
sole stockholder and president of Riley Builders, Alonzo Riley, personally
liable for the value of the judgment he obtained against the corporation.47
The court however, said that although Riley Builders was a one-man
corporation completely dominated by Alonzo Riley, and the corporate funds
were not handled with the degree of care expected from a well managed
corporation, the facts were insufficient to warrant piercing the corporate
veil.48 "In the absence of pleading and proof that the corporation was
organized for an illegal purpose or that its members fraudulently used the
corporation as a means of evading liability with respect to a transaction that
was, in truth, personal and not corporate, Fatt cannot be heard to question
the corporate existence ... ."49 The Riley court held that "the corporate veil
will not be pierced, either at law or in equity, unless it be shown that the
corporation was organized or used to mislead creditors or to perpetrate a
fraud upon them.,
50
Riley cited Biscayne Realty & Insurance Co. v. Ostend Realty Co. 51 as
authority for its holding. Interestingly, the Dania court did not directly rely
on Biscayne for the proposition that "improper conduct" must be shown in
order to pierce the corporate veil, however, certain language in Biscayne is
seemingly squarely on point.
If the stockholders of a corporation enter into a transaction in their
individual and private interests, and utilize the name of the corpo-
ration merely as a convenience for the completion of the transac-
tion, where the legal entity as such has no interest in the matter, but
the name is used to mislead creditors or perpetuate a fraud upon
them, the legal entity in the name of which the transaction was car-
ried will be ignored and the parties held to individual liability.
52
46. Riley, 47 So. 2d at 770-71.
47. d at 771.
48. Id. at 773.
49. Id.
50. Id (citations omitted).
51. 148 So. 560 (Fla. 1933).
52. d at 564 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 21:663
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The Biscayne court also noted that "'[tihe directors of a private corporation
have no right under any circumstances to use their official position for their
own individual benefit."'
5 3
The Dania court next relied on Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Industries.
5 4
In that case, Advertects recovered a money judgment against Sawyer
Industries, which was returned unsatisfied.55 Thus, Advertects sought to
have the judgment satisfied out of the personal assets of Neil and Kay
Sawyer, the stockholders of Sawyer.56 Advertects alleged that the Sawyers
organized Sawyer as a convenient means of doing business without subject-
ing themselves to personal liability.57 However, the court stated that unless
Advertects could show that Sawyer
was organized or after organization was employed by the stock-
holders for fraudulent or misleading purposes, or in some fashion
that the corporate property was converted or the corporate assets
depleted for the personal benefit of the individual stockholders, or
that the corporate structure was not bona fidely established or, in
general, that property belonging to the corporation can be traced
into the hands of the stockholders[]
the corporate veil could not be pierced. 8 As a result, the Advertects court
refused to pierce the corporate veil, even though the Sawyers: 1) habitually
operated through numerous corporations, many of which were unsuccessful;
2) were the sole stockholders; and 3) handled the business affairs poorly,
because there was no showing that the stockholders improperly converted
any of sawyer's property for their own use or abused their relationship with
Sawyer. 9
Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer,60 the last case cited by the Dania
court as authority for its holding, may be the most helpful in determining
what type of conduct can be considered improper. Dania cited Roberts' Fish
53. Id. at 565 (quoting Donovan v. Purtell, 75 N.E. 334, 337 (Il1. 1905) (summarizing
Hoffman v. Reichert, 35 N.E. 527 (II. 1893))).
54. 84 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
55. Id. at 23.
56. IM
57. IU
58. Id. at 24.
59. Advertects, 84 So. 2d at 24.
60. 153 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1963).
1997]
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Farm for its remarks on the purpose of corporate entities and the rationale
for the law controlling piercing the corporate veil.
61
The corporate entity is an accepted, well used and highly regarded
form of organization in the economic life of our state and na-
tion. . . . "Their purpose is generally to limit liability and serve a
business convenience." Those who utilize the laws of this state in
order to do business in the corporate form have every right to rely
on the rules of law which protect them against personal liability
unless it be shown that the corporation is formed or used for some
illegal, fraudulent or other unjust purpose which justifies piercing
of the corporate veil. This is the reason for the rule, stated in all
Florida cases, that the courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate
veil and will do so only in a court of competent jurisdiction, after
notice to and full opportunity to be heard by all parties, and upon
showing of cause which necessitates the corporate entity being dis-
regarded in order to prevent some injustice.62
By citing Roberts' Fish Farm in this capacity, the Dania court indicates
that a shareholder's conduct will be considered improper if it contravenes
the corporate enterprise system's purpose for existence. As Roberts' Fish
Farm indicates, a corporation's purpose is not to limit personal liability in
personalized transactions but to promote commerce and industrial growth,
and encourage investment by limiting personal liability in business transac-
tions.
V. STANDARD FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL AND DETERMINING
IMPROPER CONDUCT
The equitable nature of the piercing the corporate veil doctrine, 63 and
certain statements made by the Dania court, including the rationales of Riley,
Biscayne, Advertects, and Roberts' Fish Farm, can be combined to create a
standard for piercing the corporate veil and indicating what types of conduct
might be considered improper. In determining whether or not to pierce the
corporate veil the analysis should proceed as follows.
61. Dania, 450 So. 2d at 1120-21.
62. Roberts' Fish Farm, 153 So. 2d at 721 (citation omitted).
63. See discussion supra Section II.
[Vol. 21:663
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First, a plaintiff must seek a judicial determination of whether or not the
corporation is liable on the underlying cause of action.6 If the corporation is
found liable, the plaintiff must then try and have the judgment against the
corporation satisfied out of the corporation's assets.65 If the corporation's
assets are sufficient to satisfy the judgment, there is no need for the plaintiff
to pierce the corporate veil.6 6 If however, the judgment against the corpora-
tion is returned unsatisfied, the plaintiff may then seek to pierce the corpo-
rate veil and hold the shareholders liable for the judgment against the
corporation.
67
The first step in piercing the corporate veil is to ask why is the corpora-
tion unable to satisfy the judgment rendered against it. If the corporation is
unable to pay simply because its business affairs were poorly managed by
the shareholder(s), resulting in the corporations insolvency, the plaintiff may
not be able to pierce the corporate veil.68 However, if the corporation is
unable to satisfy the judgment due to some improper conduct on the share-
holders part, the plaintiff should be permitted to pierce the corporate veil.
The final question, then, is what type of conduct can be considered im-
proper.
It seems that a plaintiff may be able to identify improper conduct by
keeping in mind a few different statements and pervading themes mentioned
throughout the Dania opinion. First, a corporation's general purpose is to
limit personal liability and serve a business convenience, 69 and that the
64. In Dania, for example, the underlying cause of action was for personal injury sus-
tained by Ms. Sykes.
65. This will be the primary factor in determining if there is an adequate remedy at law.
66. As the Dania court noted, "'[i]f this requirement were not made then every judgment
against a corporation could be exploited as a vehicle for harassing the stockholders and
entering upon fishing expeditions into their personal business and assets."' Dania, 450 So. 2d
at 1120 (quoting Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Indus., 84 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1955)).
67. See Advertects, 84 So. 2d at 23; Riley v. Fatt, 47 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. 1950). See
supra note 14 and accompanying text. It is very important to keep in mind that a prerequisite
to equitable relief is that there be no adequate remedy at law. Until a judgment against a
corporation is returned unsatisfied, there may be no basis for piercing the corporate veil in that
there may be an adequate remedy at law, namely, enforcing the judgment against the
corporation. This may well have been one of the problems with the plaintiffs case in Dania.
The plaintiff sought to pierce the corporate veil before a judgment was returned unsatisfied. It
would seem therefore, that the corporate veil cannot, and should not, be pierced unless the
corporation has no means of satisfying a judgment against it. See Riesen v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 14 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 1943).
68. Riley, 47 So. 2d at 773 (indicating that the courts do not consider the fact that a cor-
poration was poorly run alone sufficient to constitute improper conduct).
69. Roberts' Fish Farm, 153 So. 2d at 721.
1997]
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shareholders of a corporation have no right to use their corporate positions
for their own personal benefit.7° Under this basic principle of corporate law,
if there is proof that the shareholders, or parent as the case may be, used the
corporation in order to mislead creditors,7 ' or shield themselves from
liability in a transaction that was in truth personal and not corporate, then the
privilege of incorporation has been abused and the requisite improper
conduct should be found to exist.72 Evidence of the foregoing may be
established if the corporate entity had no interest in the matter due to the
fact that the subject matter of the transaction was unrelated to the nature of
73the corporation's business,  or corporate property was converted to, or
depleted for, the personal benefit of the stockholders.74
The analysis can now proceed with a look at post-Dania decisions to
view what kind of conduct the district courts consider to be improper in
piercing the corporate veil cases. Analyzing the later cases will also indicate
how accurate the proposed standard might be in defining improper conduct.
VI. THE DISTRICT COURTS' NITERPRETATIONS OF DANIA
A. First District Court of Appeal
In Futch v. Head," Head was employed by Realty Center, Inc., a
company owned by Futch. Futch promised Head that if he helped her sell
the "Melroe" property he would receive a commission. Head found a buyer
and the deal went through. In the terms of final sale, Futch received a
twenty-percent interest in the Melroe property for her efforts. Futch ulti-
mately sold her interest in the Melroe property for $1,300,000 and paid one
of her companies a $130,000 commission from the proceeds. Head filed a
breach of contract and fraud claim when Futch failed to pay him his prom-
ised commission.76
The trial court found that the sale was consummated for Futch's benefit
and that Futch converted the interest she received in the Melroe property to
70. Biscayne Realty & Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co., 148 So. 560, 565 (Fla. 1933).
71. Riley, 47 So. 2d at 773.
72. The general underlying theme should be that a corporation cannot be used as a per-
sonal convenience to shield its shareholders from personal liability in personalized transac-
tions.
73. Biscayne, 148 So. at 564.
74. Advertects, 84 So. 2d at 24.
75. 511 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
76. Id. at 316.
[Vol. 21:663
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her own name, with the intent to deprive Head of his portion of the sale.77
The first district affirmed the trial court's findings and added that the fact
that Futch merged her corporation's liabilities and assets with her own
personal funds also constituted improper conduct. 78 Therefore, the corporate
veil was pierced and Futch was forced to pay Head's commission out of the
money she received from the sale of her portion of the property that she
converted to her own use.
79
In USP Real Estate Investment Trust v. Discount Auto Parts, Inc.,80 #90
North was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Discount Auto Parts. The property
was leased by #90 North from USP, in order to operate an auto parts busi-
ness. The premises were abandoned before the lease expired and USP sued
#90 North for breach of contract and lease agreement and was awarded a
judgment. Evidence showed that the officers of both corporations were the
same, #90 never had a bank account, filed no tax returns, could produce no
written sublease between it and Discount Auto Parts, and never kept any
receipts of expenditures. Therefore, the court found that Discount Auto
Parts simply created #90 for the purpose of holding the lease in order to
shield itself from any liability if the lease was broken. 8' In light of these
findings, the court held that the improper conduct requirement was satisfied
and the corporate veil could be pierced.82
The first district's reasoning in both cases is aligned with the proposed
standard for finding improper conduct. In Futch, the district court agreed
with the trial court that the transaction was consummated for the benefit of
the stockholder and not the corporation.8 3 Furthermore, evidence supported
the court's finding that corporate property was converted to personal use,
because Futch sold her interest in the property and converted the money to
her own use, in order to deprive Head of his commission."4 Thus, Futch used
the corporation to evade liability in a transaction that was of a personal and
not corporate nature.
In USP, the court found improper conduct when a parent created a
subsidiary for the sole purpose of holding a lease. The convincing evidence
77. Id. at 316-17.
78. Id. at 323.
79. Id.
80. 570 So. 2d 386 (Fa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
81. Id at 392-93.
82. Id. at 393.
83. Futch, 511 So. 2d at 323.
84. Id. at 317, 322-23.
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was that the subsidiary did not have any assets or conduct any business.
Again, the court would not allow the parent to use a subsidiary for the sole
purpose of shielding itself from liability where the subsidiary had no interest
in the transaction.
B. Second District Court of Appeal
In Hester v. Tucker,86 J.L. Hester, the president of International Trade, a
closely held corporation, contracted with Tucker to build a residence on
property owned by International. Hester signed the construction contract in
his capacity as president of International. When Hester refused to make
payments on the contract price, Tucker sued International and Hester
individually. Tucker stated that when he entered into the contract, he was
told that the residence would be the asset of International. However, upon
substantial completion, the house was transferred from International to
Hester.
The second district found that there was no improper conduct because
the transfer of the house from International to Hester did not establish fraud
at the time the contract was entered into.87 The court premised its decision
on the fact that International had been in business since 1966, as well as the
fact that Hester carried on extensive business projects and construction by
way of the corporation.
88
Another second district case dealing with the issue was Southeast
Capital Investment, Corp. v. Albemarle Hotel, Inc.89 In this case, Southeast
Investment, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Southeast Capital, contracted with
Albemarle to purchase the Albemarle Hotel. The contract was finalized on
the agreement that Southeast Investment would make payment of the full
purchase price at the closing. When Southeast Investment did not have the
money at the closing, Albemarle sued Southeast Capital for specific per-
formance of Southeast Investment's contractual obligations. The court held
that since the subsidiary entered into a contract for the benefit of the parent
without the present ability to perform, the requisite improper conduct was
present and the corporate veil could be pierced.90
85. USP, 570 So. 2d at 393.
86. 465 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 476 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985).
87. Id. at 1262.
88. Id.
89. Southeast Capital Inv. Corp. v. Albemarle Hotel, Inc., 550 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989).
90. Id. at51.
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The second district's reasoning in Hester does not seem to follow the
proposed standard but may indicate a possible misreading of Dania. There
does not appear to be any reason for Hester to have signed the contract in his
capacity as president of International. The contract was for the construction
of a residence. There were no facts presented that indicated why the
corporation would need a residence and no explanation of why it was
transferred to Hester after its completion. Hester clearly converted corporate
property to his own use, which is a clear example of improper conduct as
stated in Advertects.91 Moreover, Tucker certainly satisfied the requirement
of being a mislead creditor. The court's statement that fraud was not
established at the time the contract was entered into lends no support to
whether or not Hester acted improperly. Nothing in Dania indicates that the
improper conduct must take place the time a contract is entered into. The
Hester decision seems to turn Dania on its head.
Southeast Capital's reasoning is much more in line with Dania and the
proposed standard. The standard indicates that a parent cannot use a
subsidiary for the sole purpose of shielding its liability in a transaction that
the subsidiary has no interest in. The court used an identical rationale to
find of improper conduct on Southeast Capital's part.
C. Third District Court of Appeal
In Resorts International v. Charter Air Center,92 Resorts entered into
contract negotiations with Charter regarding the possibility of Charter
providing air transportation to a casino owned by Resorts. On the day the
parties sat down to sign the contract, Resorts substituted its subsidiary GB,
as the named party in the contract with Charter. When GB violated the
terms of the contract, Charter sued Resorts for damages. The court held that
GB was a mere instrumentality of Resorts, and Resorts use of GB to avoid
liability on the contract with Charter was sufficient improper conduct to
pierce the corporate veil. 93
In Estudios Proyectos e Inversiones de Centro America, S.A. v.
Swiss Bank Corp., S.A., 94 Granados, who owned a controlling interest in
EPICA individually, personally guaranteed the repayment of loans given by
BNP, the creditor, to ACIA, the debtor. BNP assigned an interest in some of
these notes to Swiss Bank Corp., appellee. When ACIA and Granados
91. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
92. 503 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
93. Id.
94. 507 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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defaulted on payment of the notes, the trial court issued an order on SBC's
behalf allowing attachment of a farm owned by Estudios. 95 The court of
appeals held that although Estudios was not a debtor of SBC, Estudios was
Granados' alter ego because Granados had a history of transferring his
property to Estudios to shield it from creditors. 96 This was considered
improper conduct and the attachment was allowed.97
In Ally v. Naim,98 Naim was injured during his employment with
Hialeah Vending, a company owned by Ally. Naim made a workers com-
pensation claim against Hialeah and Ally individually. 99 However, Naim
only received a judgment against Hialeah.1 °°  When the judgment was
returned unsatisfied, Naim sought to pierce the corporate veil of Hialeah and
impose personal liability on Ally for Hialeah Vending's obligations.' 0' The
court noted that although Hialeah's business affairs were poorly handled by
Ally, there was no showing that Ally improperly converted its property to his
own use or abused his relationship with the corporate entity.1
0 2
The third district cases indicate the accuracy of the proposed standard,
and provide factual scenarios which exemplify where improper conduct is,
and is not, present. In Resorts, the fact that the parent tried to substitute its
subsidiary as the contracting party at the last minute is clear evidence of an
attempt to evade liability if the contract was breached. Furthermore, the
subsidiary had no interest in the transaction other than to shield the parent
form liability. In Estudios, there was evidence that the shareholder had a
history of transferring property to his corporation to shield it from creditors.
This is clear abuse of the purpose of the corporate entity. In Ally, the
shareholder did not act improperly just because the small company did not
produce enough income to cover the amount of a judgment against it.
Therefore, the third district decisions seem to indicate that the proposed
standard correctly states the criteria for defining improper conduct.
95. Id. at 1120.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1121.
98. 581 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
99. Id. at 962.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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D. Fourth District Court of Appeal
In Eagle v. Benefield-Chappell, Inc., °3 Eagle contracted with Bene-
field-Chappell to design and furnish a condominium unit. Derrell Benefield
and Virginia Chappell were sole shareholders of Benefield-Chappell.
Benefield-Chappell arranged for Daro Builders to do the construction work
on the condominium. Daro completed the work and submitted the costs to
Benefield-Chappell. Benefield-Chappell obtained some of Daro's stationery
and prepared an identical breakdown, but increased the costs by thirty-
percent. This invoice was sent to Eagle.
Next, Eagle sent two $50,000 payments to Benefield-Chappell for
furniture deposits. However, shortly thereafter the parties had a falling out
and terminated the contract, but Benefield-Chappell refused to return the
deposits. Prior to trial, the corporate account that Eagle's $100,000 was
deposited in was depleted to as low as $22,000.
Eagle sued the corporation and Benefield and Chappell individually.
The court held that the retention of funds belonging to the Eagles constituted
conversion and the deliberate increase of actual construction costs, contrary
to the terms of their contract, constituted improper conduct. 104 The court did
remark that failure to issue stock and keep proper corporate records, standing
alone, was insufficient grounds to render the individuals personally liable.10 5
In 111 Properties, Inc. v. Lassiter,10 6 Vara was the sole shareholder of
111, a corporation that purchased property from Lassiter's corporation
A&M. Vara acknowledged that 111 Properties was formed in part because
Lassiter, a partner of A&M, disliked Vara and would not sell the property to
him. 111 Properties and Vara were later sued by A&M on a breach of
contract theory based on assertions made in the contract by 111 Properties
and Vara. The court held that the corporate veil could not be pierced on the
grounds that 111 Properties was formed to keep the seller A&M from
knowing who they were selling to. 10 7 The court said that although Vara's
use of the corporate entity was "clever," it was not the kind of improper
conduct referred to in Dania.'0°
Eagle does not provide much help in interpreting what type of conduct
might be considered improper because the facts clearly show conversion and
103. 476 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
104. Id. at718-19.
105. Id. at 719 (citations omitted).
106. 605 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
107. Id. at 125-26.
108. Id. at 126.
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fraud on behalf of the shareholders which will always warrant piercing the
corporate veil. 111 Properties, however, is more interesting. Although there
was no evidence that the corporation was being used to evade liability, it was
admittedly used to mislead the seller of the property. Notwithstanding, the
case does not present the proper factual scenario for piercing the corporate
veil or implementing the proposed standard.
E. Fifth District Court of Appeal
In Walton v. Tomax, Corp.,1°9 McGuire was the manager of Tomax
Construction. His wife was the sole shareholder but did not participate in
the management of the corporation. Walton paid Tomax $20,000 as a
deposit for a home that Tomax was to construct for Walton. After Tomax
received the deposit it never again contacted Walton. Tomax filed for
bankruptcy in 1990, a few months after it received Walton's deposit. The
court found that the property that Tomax was to build Walton's house on
was never owned by Tomax and that McGuire mishandled funds through the
corporation." 0 Therefore, improper conduct was found and McGuire could
be held liable for the return of Walton's deposit that was paid to Tomax."'
The Walton decision is reminiscent of the fourth district's Eagle
decision. The officer of Tomax accepted a deposit for the purchase of
property that was not even owned by the corporation and would not return it.
This exceeds "improper conduct" and borders on fraud or conversion. Since
fraud and conversion are much more egregious than improper conduct, the
fifth district had no trouble finding that McGuire acted improperly.
After reviewing the district court decisions, it seems that the proposed
standard for finding improper conduct could effectively be used in piercing
the corporate veil cases. The district courts seem to agree that so long as a
party can show that the corporation was used as a tool to evade liability, with
respect to a transaction in which the corporation has no interest, improper
conduct will be found.
109. 632 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
110. Id. at 180.
I111. Id. at 18 1.
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VII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPROPER CONDUCT AND
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Treatises and case law agree that one of the theories most frequently
employed to justify piercing the corporate veil is equitable estoppel.' 2 This
makes perfect sense in that piercing the corporate veil was developed as an
equitable doctrine. ' 3 As will be seen, the phrase improper conduct takes on
a more definite identity when viewed in the context of equitable estoppel.
The relationship between the two is brought to light, in the piercing the
corporate veil context, in Oregon case law. Oregon courts, in fact, used the
improper conduct requirement in piercing the corporate veil cases long
before Florida. ' 4 The leading case in Oregon that explains and applies the
improper conduct standard is Amfac Foods, Inc. v. International Systems &
Controls Corp.l'"
The Amfac court stated that misrepresentation, commingling, and
holding out, are types of conduct that have been held to be improper in
piercing the corporate veil cases.1 6 Interestingly, the Amfac court noted that
some of the cases it cited for the proposition that misrepresentation consti-
tutes improper conduct would also allow recovery on an estoppel theory."
7
In essence, the Amfac court illuminated the relationship between improper
conduct and equitable estoppel. By definition, "[e]quitable estoppel is a
judicially-developed doctrine that precludes a party to a lawsuit, because of
some improper conduct on that party's part, from asserting a claim or
112. See Anderson v. Kennebec River Pulp & Paper Co., 433 A.2d 752, 756 n.5 (Me.
1981) (citing cases and treatises supporting the proposition that equitable estoppel is
frequently employed to pierce the corporate veil); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610, 617 n.7 (N.D. Me. 1977) (citing cases and treatises
supporting this proposition). It is important to make the distinction that the estoppel theory is
also used for another purpose in piercing the corporate veil cases. In piercing cases that
involve defrauded or misled creditors, counsel representing the corporation will sometimes
argue that the creditor is estopped from alleging that the shareholders are liable, since the
creditor chose to contract with the corporation and did not get personal guarantees from the
shareholders or further investigate the corporation's credit worthiness.
113. See discussion supra Section II.
114. The reader should be aware that Dania does not cite any Oregon authority as prece-
dent for developing the improper conduct standard; however, since Oregon is the only state
that used improper conduct as a standard in piercing the corporate veil actions before Florida,
Oregon case law cannot be ignored in trying to decipher the meaning of improper conduct.
115. 654 P.2d 1092 (Or. 1982).
116. Id at 1102.
117. Id at 1098, 1102 n.17.
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defense, regardless of its substantive validity.""' 8 If equitable estoppel can
be triggered by improper conduct, it is plausible to posit that the elements of
equitable estoppel may be used to prove improper conduct.
Although the Amfac court did not mention the doctrine of equitable
estoppel by name to describe the elements it requires to show improper
conduct and pierce the corporate veil, the Amfac court's requirements and
the elements of equitable estoppel are virtually the same. The Amfac court
started with the contention that misrepresentation is a type of improper
conduct."19 The Amfac court continued that the shareholder's conduct must
have been improper in relation to the plaintiff entering the transaction, 20 and
there must be a relationship between the improper conduct and the plaintiff's
injury.' 21 Essentially, the court said that improper conduct occurs when: 1)
there is a misrepresentation; 2) that causes the plaintiff to enter into a
transaction; and 3) the misrepresentation interferes with the corporation's
performance of its obligation toward the plaintiff.' 22 A comparison of the
Amfac court's elements to those of traditional equitable estoppel will
indicate the similarities.
Equitable estoppel as defined by the Supreme Court of Florida requires:
1) a misrepresentation of material fact; 2) reliance on that misrepresentation;
and 3) which causes injury to the party claiming estoppel. 123 In sum, the
118. Combs v. United States, 790 F. Supp. 850, 852 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (citing Phelps v.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 785 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)).
See generally Hamilton v. Komatsu Dresser Indus., Inc., 964 F.2d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1992);
State Bank of Coloma v. National Flood Ins. Program, 851 F.2d 817, 819 (6th Cir. 1988);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Roldan Fonseca, 795 F.2d 1102 (1st Cir. 1986); Long v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1320, 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1991); United States v. Paez, 866 F.
Supp. 62 (D.P.R. 1994);United States v. Murwin, No. 90-2309-0, 1990 WL 254984, at *2 (D.
Kan. 1990); United States v. Government Dev. Bank, 725 F. Supp. 96 (D.P.R. 1989);
Independent Fire Co. No. 1 v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E. 2d 612 (W.
Va. 1988); In re Upset Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Wayne County, 510 A.2d 1291 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986).
119. Amfac, 654 P.2d at 1102. The Amfac court also indicated that "misrepresentations
which may not be sufficient to constitute fraud would support a recovery against a shareholder
on a misrepresentation theory." Id.
120. Id. at 1101.
121. Id. at 1103. In regard to this causation requirement, the Amfac court noted that the
improper conduct must have either caused the plaintiff to enter into the transaction with the
corporation or caused the corporation to default on the underlying obligation. Id. at 1101.
122. Amfac, 654 P.2d at 1101-02.
123. State Dept. of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1981) (citing Green-
hut Constr. Co. v. Henry A. Knott, Inc., 247 So. 2d 517, 524 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971)).
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elements of improper conduct required by the Oregon courts are almost
identical to the elements of equitable estoppel as stated by Florida courts.
In the absence of clearer guidance from the Florida courts on what type
of conduct can be considered improper, an argument based on what Oregon
considers to be improper conduct, although not controlling, would seem to
be extremely persuasive. Moreover, because authorities in the field agree
that equitable estoppel can be used to pierce the corporate veil and the
elements required to prove equitable estoppel in Florida are the same as
those required by the Oregon courts to prove improper conduct, the Florida
practitioner might possibly use the elements of equitable estoppel to prove
that improper conduct is present, instead of simply trying to argue what
improper conduct is without any clear guidelines at all.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the Dania court did not make it completely clear what type of
conduct could be considered improper, the proposed standard or the equita-
ble estoppel theory should provide a persuasive means by which to prove
improper conduct. Regardless, absent further clarification from the courts,
piercing the corporate veil cases, and the metaphors used therein, may
continue to be as elusive as they have been in the past.
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